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Abstract
We analyse finite two player games in which agents maximize given
arbitrary private payoffs which we call ideologies. We define an equi-
librium concept and prove existence. Based on this setup, a monotone
evolutionary dynamic governs the distribution of ideologies within the
population. For any finite 2 player normal form game we show that there
is an open set of ideologies being not equivalent to the objective payoffs
that is not selected against by evolutionary monotonic dynamics. If the
game has a strict equilibrium set, we show stability of non-equivalent
ideologies. We illustrate these results for generic 2× 2-games.
JEL codes: C72, C73, D82
Keywords: Dynamic Stability, Evolution of Preferences, Imitation Dynamics
1 Introduction and Related Literature
Suppose rational agents meet to interact in a strategic situation and none
of them has verifiable information about the payoffs of the game. Instead,
each agent has been socialized by some ideology that specifies a private payoff
matrix. Agents then play the game as to maximize the private payoffs. To give
an example, consider a measure taken to prevent terrorist attacks in airplanes:
passengers are not allowed to bring flasks with their hand luggage that can
∗correspondence: lkoch@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de
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contain more than 100 ml of liquid. Since this measure was taken until now,
no catastrophe was caused by a large amount of liquid in the hand luggage.
The reason could be that the measure is indeed successful. Another reasoning
could be that 100 ml of liquid in a single bottle is no threat to an airplane,
in other words that the measure is useless. The passenger is not capable to
verify the utility gained by the measure but is oblieged to believe in a payoff.
In this paper the view is taken that there is no objective knowledge on this
matter, because the real payoffs are not observable, maybe not even available,
at least not verifiable. Instead, interacting agents have private payoffs. To
stay in the example, given the measure some agents might feel more secure
and therefore more comfortable while airborne; other agents might be annoyed
due to the security restrictions and additional waiting times. We do not claim
that a particular position is true or false (actually, as the modeller of the
problem we assume that certain payoffs are true). We aim to show that even
if some perception of reality is wrong, there might be no selection against this
perception based on the true payoffs. The key result from this paper is that
for any (Nash-) equilibrium in situations of strategic interaction, there exist
non-equivalent views regarding the payoffs – ideologies – that cannot be driven
out by evolutionary dynamics.
In this paper we model an ideology as a bias that shifts the subjective
payoffs. We allow for an unbounded continuum of biases, that is for any two
player game with finite strategy space there may exist several groups of agents
at the same time, each group believing to face a different payoff matrix. Once
in a while, agents change their ideology, however we assume they do so bound-
edly rational and model the adaptation of ideologies with an evolutionary
monotonic process: ideologies that result in behavior that produces relatively
high objective payoffs spread faster within the population. Hence we assume
that the “currency” of evolution are the objective payoffs. The gist of this
paper is that even if evolution cares for an exclusive specification of payoffs,
interacting agents may permanently maximize alternative private payoffs even
though these payoffs are subject to evolution. This paper relies heavily on
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Sandholm (2001) who constructs a similar model for symmetric 2 × 2-games
in which the payoffs of some action are biased, we build upon this model by
allowing for biases for outcomes of the game. We focus less on the dynamic
that yields equilibrium behavior, but assume equilibrium behavior explicitly.
Hereby tractability is gained and one can study general finite m × n-normal
form games. Symmetric 2-player games with a unique pure strategy equi-
librium were also studied by Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007) within a
similar framework. Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) construct a model in which
agents either know the true payoffs of a symmetric game or maximize some al-
ternative symmetric utility function, while they allow for the presence of only
one such alternative utility function. For symmetric two player games they
show global stability of states in which all agents maximize the true payoffs.
We show that for any finite game there is an open set of ideologies that are
not equivalent to the objective payoffs and that survive in an evolutionary
scenario. This includes the special case of symmetric 2× 2-games. The main
difference of our model to Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001)is that we allow for
asymmetric payoffs and where we study symmetric games we do not assume
behavioral distinguishability. Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) state that behav-
ioral distinguishability is necessary for the fact that agents who maximize the
evolutionary relevant payoffs have an evolutionary advantage. However, this
property is not sufficient: for some asymmetric games we show survival of non-
individualistic preferences, even if they are behaviorally distinguishable. We
do so right away for a simple example, to provide a flavor of the model.
Consider the well known matching pennies game. Suppose that the row
population has agents of three types. One third maximizes the true payoffs.
Another third has a bias towards “(head, head)”, the last third is biased to-
wards “(tail, tail)”. The biases are depicted below:
H T
H (-1,1) (1,-1)
T (1,-1) (-1,1)
objective payoffs
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H T
H (-1+1,1) (1,-1)
T (1,-1) (-1,1)
H T
H (-1,1) (1,-1)
T (1,-1) (-1+1,1)
bias for
1
3
of row bias for
1
3
of row
To keep the example simple, the column population is completely unbiased.
Each agent knows the sum of the true payoffs and her bias. Suppose the column
population mixes equally between heads and tails. Then, head-biased agents
optimally choose head, tail-biased agents optimally choose tail while unbiased
row agents are just indifferent (assume they mix equally between heads and
tails). In this situation each agent maximizes subjective payoffs and no agent
has an incentive to deviate. Any agent gets the same real payoffs on average.
Moreover, any type has different equilibrium behavior.
Ely and Yilankaya (2001) study which set of outcomes is supported by
stable preferences in normal form games. As they rely on static concepts to
infer stability properties, we define a dynamic process explicitely to analyze
stability issues. In their model, any set of alternative payoff specifications
that is robust to exogenous shocks implies equilibrium behavior that produces
a probability distribution over the set of Nash equilibria. Ely and Yilankaya
(2001) do not have results for the case in which there is zero mass on ideologies
that represent the true preferences. Our results concern exactly the case that
excludes positive mass on true preferences. The static equilibrium concept
offered in this paper does not imply Nash behavior, while those equilibria that
satisfy a stability property –dynamically stable equilibrium– do induce a Nash
equilibrium.
2 Model
2.1 The Stage Game
We consider two infinite populations of agents from which at each point of
continuous time, a pair (one agent from each population) is uniformly and
independently drawn to play a finite two player normal form game. An agent of
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population i chooses an element si of the finite strategy set Si with cardinality
ni. For convenience, define n = ni · nj. The objective payoffs are represented
by the ni × nj matrix U i, where U i(si, sj) denotes i’s objective utility from
the outcome generated by (si, sj). We assume that agents are unable to verify
the objective payoffs. For each population i, each agent is characterized by
a ni × nj-matrix of parameters θi = {θi(s)}s∈S that induces the subjective
payoffs. An agent θi believes to play a game that specifies her payoffs as
ui(s, θi) = U i(si, sj) + θi(si, sj), si ∈ Si, sj ∈ Sj. Let u be extended to the
space of mixed strategies and define ui((si, σj), θi) =
∑
sj∈Sj σ
j(sj)(U i(si, sj)+
θi(si, sj)).
We will show that depending on the game, some ideologies that are non-
equivalent to the objective payoffs won’t have a long-run evolutionary disad-
vantage.
We assume that for each population i types are distributed among the
agents by some atomless density fi : Rn → R+ with cumulative distribution
function Fi : Rn → [0, 1]. To be precise, “atomless” here means
∫
H fi(θ
i)dθi =
0 for any hyperplane H in Rn. The types are independently distributed across
populations, that is F (Θi,Θj) = Fi(Θ
i) · Fj(Θj) ∀Θi,Θj ⊂ Rn.
2.2 Equivalent Ideologies
An agent with parameters θi(s) = 0 ∀ s ∈ S plays the game given the objective
payoffs. These payoffs represent the evolutionary relevant payoffs.
An ideology θi is equivalent to the objective payoffs U i, if sign{U i(s) −
U i(s′)} = sign{ui(s, θi) − ui(s′, θi)} ∀ s, s′ ∈ S. Whenever θi is equivalent to
the zero bias for i = 1, 2, we write θ ⇔ 0.
The definition of equivalence is relatively weak. One could also demand a
stronger version, for example that there must exist a positive affine function
h : R→ R such that ui(s) = h(U i(s)) ∀ s. This, however, would only weaken
the main result of this paper. The main result concerns a situation in which
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no agent holds an ideology that is equivalent to the zero bias. Of course, this
includes situations in which agents do not hold “strongly equivalent” ideologies.
2.3 Optimal Choices
Suppose agents of population i believe σj to be the probability distribution
over the strategies of population j 6= i. An agent of type θi chooses si iff
si ∈ argmaxui((s˜i, σj), θi). We assume that in equilibrium, for all i, all agents
of population i hold the same belief σj. This assumption is critical to the
concept we develop in the following and therefore also to the results of this
paper. Nevertheless, note that it is not as ad hoc as it might seem at first
sight. The beliefs σj are not about an object that is unobservable – like prefer-
ences, ideologies or tastes. The belief σj is defined as a probability measure on
actual actions taken by opponents. Since all agents observe this information,
homogeneous beliefs seem natural.
Define the set of types Θsi(σ
j) that choose strategy si given σj as
Θsi(σ
j) := {θi ∈ Rn | si ∈ argmaxui((s˜i, σj), θi)}
Any belief σj defines such a set Θsi(σ
j) uniquely. We implicetly assume that
agents maximize myopically.
Lemma 1
For i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, given any σj ∈ ∆(Sj) there is no si ∈ Si such that
Θsi(σ
j) = ∅.
Proof
Fix a constant K > max
si∈Si
|U i(si, σj)|. The max is well defined because S is
finite. Then the bias θi with θi(si, sj) = K and θi(s˜i, sj) = −K for s˜i 6= si im-
poses the choice of si, since ui((si, σj), θi) = U i(si, σj)+K > U i(s˜i, σj)−K =
ui((s˜i, σj), θi) ∀ s˜i 6= si. There is an open set Θ˜i around θi such that si is op-
timal for all θi ∈ Θ˜i. Therefore, ∅ 6= Θ˜i ⊂ Θsi(σj) and Θsi(σj) is non-empty. 
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The lemma states that given σj, for any si, the objective payoffs Ui(·, ·) can
be biased so strongly towards si such that the agent maximizes her subjective
payoffs by choosing si.
If all agents of population j share the same belief σi on the behavior of popu-
lation i, the true probability of an agent from population j choosing sj is:
Fj(Θsj(σ
i)) :=
∫
Θ
sj
(σi)
Fj(dθ
j)
2.4 Equilibrium
We assume that in equilibrium j’s belief that i plays si, σi(si), and the true
probability that i plays si, Fi(Θsi(σ
j)), coincide: σi(si) = Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) ∀ si ∈
Si, i = 1, 2.
Definition Equilibrium Set
A collection {Θsi}si , i = 1, 2 is an equilibrium set given cdf F , if
E1 Θsi ⊂ Θsi(σj) ∀ si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2 and
E2 σ
i(si) = Fi(Θsi) ∀ si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2 and
E3 Fi(∪si∈SiΘsi) = 1, i = 1, 2.
In short we denote an equilibrium set by {Θs} given F .
E1 demands that agents optimally choose their strategy given their beliefs and
subjective payoffs. E2 demands that beliefs on behavior equal actual proba-
bilites. E3 is a technical condition which becomes necessary as we assumed
non-atomic probabilities. In equilibrium all agents in the same population
hold the same beliefs over the behavior of the other population and maximize
given their subjective (and heterogeneous) payoffs. Further beliefs equal true
probabilities. The definition states that equilibrium set depends on a specific
distribution F . Since F is arbitrary, the induced equilibrium distribution on
the set of outcomes S does not at all need to be a Nash equilibrium distribu-
tion. However, any Nash equilibrium can be represented by an Equilibrium
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set by an appropriate choice of F . This is implied by Theorem 1 below.
Lemma 2
The function Gsj(σ
i) = Fj(Θsj(σ
i)) is continuous in σi ∀ sj, i.
Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition Existence
For any F , here exists at least one pair of beliefs σ = (σi, σj) such that
σi(si) = Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) ∀si ∈ Si, i 6= j = 1, 2 .
Proof:
To prove the result we apply Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem. Any continuous
function G : Σ → Σ has a fixed point b∗ ∈ Σ such that G(b∗) = b∗, where
Σ = ∆(S1)×∆(S2). σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ. The function G(σ) = (G1(σ2), G2(σ1))
maps from Σ to Σ. Lemma 2 above states that Gisi(σ
j) is continuous in σj for
all si. Therefore, all requirements are met and we can apply Brouwer’s Fixed
Point Theorem to proof existence. 
Note that the set {Θˆs}s, Θˆs = Θs(σˆ) is an equilibrium set given F . Note
further that Θs(σ) is not uhc, see the appendix for details. There may be
many σ = (σ1, σ2) satisfying the equilibrium conditions given the same distri-
bution F . The assumption that all i-agents hold the same belief σj implies
that they manage to coordinate on one of potentially many equilibria. How-
ever, we do not select any equilibrium; the results require only that the agents
coordinate on some, but not on which equilibrium.1
2.5 Evolutionary Dynamics
Given some cdf F with density f and some equilibrium set {Θs}, agents of
population i with type θi ∈ Θsi receive objective payoffs
1Implicitly, we assume that behavior adjusts with infinite speed. Sandholm (2001) shows
in a symmetric 2×2-games setting, that the infinite speed dynamics can be expressed as the
limit of finite speed dynamics.
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U i(si, Fj) =
∑
sj U
i(si, sj)Fj(Θsj). Once in a while agents adopt different
ideologies. We assume that this dynamic process can be captured by the
deterministic differential equation
F˙i(Θ
i) =
∫
Θi
gi(θ
i, F, {Θs})Fi(dθi) , ∀Θi ⊂ Rn, i = 1, 2 (1)
where gi(θ
i, F, {Θs}) is the growth rate of the marginal density fi at θi given
cdf F and some equilibrium set {Θs}.2 We require gi(θi, F, {Θs}) to maintain
the probability property of (F1, F2), that is
∫
Rn gi(θ
i, F, {Θs})fi(θi)dθi = 0, i =
1, 2 and we require gi(θ
i, F, {Θs}) to be Lipschitz continuous in F . Then, as
Oechssler and Riedel (2001) show, for any initial distribution F (0) a solution
F (t) exists. If gi(θ
i, F, {Θs}) = U i(si, Fj)−
∑
sˆi Fi(Θsˆi)·U i(sˆi, Fj), the dynamic
is the well known replicator dynamic. We assume that g(θ, F, {Θs}) fulfills the
less demanding requirement of monotonicity3, that is
M U i(si, Fj) > (=)U
i(sˆi, Fj)⇒ gi(θi, F, {Θs}) > (=)gi(θˆi, F, {Θs})
for θi ∈ Θsi and θˆi ∈ Θsˆi . Suppose strategy si yields higher objective pay-
offs than strategy sˆi in a particular equilibrium. Payoff monotonicity implies
that the mass of agents that follow an ideology that recommends the choice
of si grows. In the context of Bjo¨rnerstedt and Weibull (1996), this means
that “unsuccessful” agents who choose sˆi revise their ideology more often than
agents who choose si.
Two agents that have biases θi, θ˜i ∈ Θsi ⊂ Θsi(σj) both optimally choose
si and gain the same objective payoffs Ui(s
i, σj). For payoff monotonic dy-
namics this implies that gi(θ
i, F, {Θs}) = gi(θ˜i, F, {Θs}). We will sometimes
denote this growthrate by gsi(F, {Θs}).
In this model, agents face a twofold decision problem. Firstly, agents adapt
an ideology. We assume that this is done boundedly rational, for example
2Bjo¨rnerstedt and Weibull (1996) give an interpretation of imitating agents that produces
such a dynamic on the space of strategies.
3Samuelson and Zhang (1992)
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by imitation, maybe even subconsciously. In particular, agents do not apply
“backwards induction” by anticipating a particular equilibrium and thereby in-
duced payoffs. Secondly, agents act rationally by maximizing their subjective
payoffs induced by their ideology.
3 Results
In this section we collect the results of this paper. The first two statements
concern the unperturbed model, while the second two consider stability and
therefore a dynamic environment with mutations.
We begin with Lemma 3 that states that if an equilibrium set represents a
Nash equilibrium, then it is a restpoint of the dynamics.
Lemma 3
Let {Θsi}si∈Si , i = 1, 2 be an equilibrium set given F = (F1, F2). Let σi(si) =
Fi(Θsi) ∀ si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2. If σ is a Nash equilibrium given objective payoffs
of the game, then F is a restpoint of (1).
Proof
(σi, σj) being a Nash equilibrium of the unbiased game 〈N,S, U〉 implies for all
si, s˜i ∈ Si : Fi(Θsi), Fi(Θs˜i) > 0 that U i(si, σj) = U i(s˜i, σj). From monotonic-
ity of (1) follows that gi(θ
i, F, {Θs}) = gi(θ˜i, F, {Θs}) = g¯i(F, {Θs}) ∀ θi ∈
Θsi , θ˜
i ∈ Θs˜i . We can rewrite (1) as
F˙i(Θ
i) =
∑
si∈Si:F (Θsi )>0
∫
Θi∩Θsi
gi(θ
i, F, {Θs})fi(θi)dθi
= g¯i(F, {Θs})
∑
si∈Si:F (Θsi )>0
∫
Θi∩Θsi
fi(θ
i)dθi
= g¯i(F, {Θs}) · F (Θi)
Since F˙ (Rn) = 0 and F (Rn) = 1 we have g¯i(F, {Θs}) = 0. Therefore
F˙i(Θ) = g¯
i(F, {Θs}) · Fi(Θ) = 0 ∀ Θ ⊂ Rn. 
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We would like to mention Ely and Yilankaya (2001) who show also “stability”
in a related framework. We suspect that this is a very courageous interpreta-
tion of a system being in a steady state. In the model presented here, dynamic
stability does not apply to all Nash equilibria. We give an example in the next
section.
The next theorem states that for any Nash equilibrium we can find an equi-
librium set such that in fact no agent maximizes payoffs that are equivalent to
the unbiased payoffs of the game. The proof is constructive.
Theorem 1
Given a finite game, any Nash equilibrium σ of that game can be represented
by an equilibrium set {Θsi}si∈Si , i = 1, 2 with respect to a cdf F such that
i) Fi(Θsi) = σ
i(si) si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2 and
ii) if Θi ⊂ Rn is equivalent to the zero-bias, then Fi(Θi) = 0.
Proof
Case: strategy si is strictly dominant. Fix some sˇj : σj(sˇj) < 1 and some
sˇi 6= si. Consider the conditions A and B:
A θi(si, sˇj) < −Ui(si, sˇj)
θi(sˇi, sˇj) > −Ui(sˇi, sˇj)
B
∑
sj 6=sˇj σ
j(sj)[Ui(s
i, sj) + θi(si, sj)] > −σj(sˇj)[Ui(si, sˇj) + θi(si, sˇj)]∑
sj 6=sˇj σ
j(sj)[Ui(sˇ
i, sj) + θi(sˇi, sj)] < −σj(sˇj)[Ui(sˇi, sˇj) + θi(sˇi, sˇj)]
These conditions restrict {θi(si, sj)}sj∈Sj and {θi(sˇi, sj)}sj∈Sj to be in a half-
space of Rnj . Define Θˆsi = {θi ∈ Θsi(σj) | θi satisfies A, B}. Condition B
implies that Θsi(σ
j) strictly contains Θˆsi . Condition A implies Ui(s
i, sˇj) +
θi(si, sˇj) < Ui(sˇ
i, sˇj)+ θi(sˇi, sˇj) and hence that no θi ∈ Θˆsi is equivalent to the
zero bias.
Case: strategy si is not strictly dominant. Fix some sˇi 6= si. For K =
maxsˇi,sj Ui(sˇ
i, sj)− Ui(si, sj) define
Θˆsi =
{
θi ∈ int (Θsi(σj)) | θi(si, sj) > K, θi(sˇi, sj) < −K ∀ sj ∈ Sj} .
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For any θi ∈ Θˆsi the following holds for any sj:
Ui(s
i, sj) + θi(si, sj) > Ui(s
i, sj) +K
≥ Ui(si, sj) + Ui(sˇi, sj)− Ui(si, sj) ≥
Ui(sˇ
i, sj)−K > Ui(sˇi, sj) + θi(sˇi, sj)
Therefore, no θi ∈ Θˆsi is equivalent to the zero bias.
Finally, choose a cdf Fˆ = (Fˆi, Fˆj) such that Fˆi(Θˆsi) = σ
i(si) ∀ si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2.
{Θˆsi}si∈Si , i = 1, 2 is an equilibrium set given Fˆ and Fˆi(Θ) > 0 implies that
θi ∈ Θ is not equivalent to the zero bias. 
The proof distinguishes two cases for each strategy of each player i, the one in
which si is strictly dominant and the one in which it is not. For the first case,
there is a set of ideologies Θˆsi that still induce the choice of s
i given σj, but
also bias the player toward some alternative strategy sˇi, if player j would play
that strategy sˇj which is not used with certainty in equilibrium. Strategy si is
therefore not strictly dominant given the biases in Θˆsi .
For the second case, in which si is not strictly dominant, a fraction σi(si)
of population i has an ideology that induces the choice of strategy si given any
strategy of population j – agents with such an ideology believe strategy si to
be strictly dominant.
The distribution Fˆi has mass one on Θˆsi . In both cases there is no agent
who maximizes payoffs that are equivalent to the objective payoffs. Secondly,
we know from Lemma 3 that no agent would profit in terms of objective payoffs
by deviating from his strategy choice, because the distribution Fˆ is a restpoint
of the monotonic dynamic (1).
The next results concern stability with respect to small perturbations. The
stability notion considered here is Lyapunov stability. A state is Lyapunov
stable, if once it is perturbed very slightly, it does not move further away.
“Slightliness” is measured by the variational norm, that –from our point of
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view– represents best the model of mutations.
Let ||F − F ′|| denote the variational norm:
||F − F ′|| = suph
∣∣∫
Rn h(θ)(f(θ)− f ′(θ))dθ
∣∣, where the supremum is taken
over all measurable functions h : Rn → R satisfying supθ |h(θ)| ≤ 12 .4
As in Oechssler and Riedel (2001)’s remark, we discuss the relation of the
variational norm to the concept of mutations in evolutionary game theory.
Consider a cdf F that has measure zero on some set Θ. Now suppose a small
group (of size 
1− > 0) enters the population, that has a cdf F
′ with measure
one on Θ. The new normalized distribution is F  = (1 − ) · F +  · F ′ and
has distance suph|
∫
R\Θ h(θ)(f(θ)− (1− )f(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)dθ +
∫
Θ
h(θ)(0− f ′(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
)dθ| =
1
2
(1− F (Θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
) + 1
2
F ′(Θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=  from F . Therefore, if the group of entering
mutants is relatively small, the distribution changes only little. Consider in-
stead that the original distribution F has mass one on a ball Θ with radius δ
around the point θ and that each agent changes his belief of the payoffs only
a little, say shifts it by  · (1, 1, . . . , 1),  > 2δ such that the new distribu-
tion F  has measure one on a ball Θ = Θ +  · (1, 1, . . . , 1). Then, F and
F  have distance suph|
∫
Θ
h(θ)(f(θ)− f (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)dθ +
∫
Θ
h(θ)(f(θ)− f (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
)dθ| =
1
2
F (Θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+1
2
F (Θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= 1, which is the maximal distance. That means, if all
agents mutate, even very little, the measure of change of the distribution is
maximal; if only a very small fraction of the population mutates, even very
starkly, the measure of change is very small. From my point of view, the norm
reflects the logic of mutations adequately: mutations occur independently and
with probability of equal order (in ) across agents. Multiple instantaneous
mutations are therefore less probable than a single mutation. On the other
hand, since mutations are arbitrary per se, a mutation “far away” has prob-
ability of the same order (in ) as mutation “close by”. Other norms such as
4We take the definition of the variational norm from Oechssler and Riedel (2001).
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for examlpe the weak topology (here: L2-norm) also captures changes that
concern all agents, which could be a global change of the payoffs or statistical
environment. Such changes are not under consideration in the model studied
in this paper.
Definition
Let F ∗ be a restpoint satisfying F˙ ∗i (Θ) = 0 ∀ Θ ⊂ Rn, i = 1, 2. Then F ∗ is
Lyapunov stable if ∀  > 0 ∃ η > 0 :
||Fi(0)− F ∗i || < η ∀ i⇒ ||Fi(t)− F ∗i || <  ∀ t > 0,∀ i
This stability notion is less demanding than for example being weakly- or
strongly- attracting, which would mean that a perturbation would be forced
to converge back to the original distribution. We cannot demand this stronger
property because there always exist many distributions with the same support
that are Lyapunov stable.
Definition
An equilibrium set {Θs} is dynamically stable with respect to some cdf F , if
F is Lyapunov stable given {Θs} and {Θs} is an equilibrium set given F .
Dynamic stability is the natural requirement of an equilibrium set being robust
to small perturbations in the distribution of biases. The next lemma states
that Lyapunov stability implies Nash equilibrium. This property is satisfied
in most models of evolutionary game theory.
Lemma 4
Let {Θs} be dynamically stable with respect to some cdf F . Then σ with
σi(s
i) = Fi(Θsi) ∀ si ∈ Si is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof
F is Lyapunov stable. Hence F is a rest point, F˙ (Θ) = 0 ∀ Θ ⊂ Rn and
i) Fi(Θ˜) > 0⇒ gi
(
θ˜i, F {Θs}
)
= 0 ∀ θ˜i ∈ Θ˜
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ii) Fi(Θˆ) = 0⇒ gi
(
θˆi, F {Θs}
)
≤ 0 ∀ θˆi ∈ Θˆ
For a strategy si with σi(si) = Fi (Θsi) > 0 it follows ∀sˆi that gisi (F, {Θs}) ≥
gisˆi (F, {Θs}). Monotonicity then implies Ui(si, σj) ≥ Ui(sˆi, σj) ∀si ∈ Si :
σi(si) > 0 and sˆi ∈ Si, therefore σ is a Nash equilibrium. 
We note that the reverse statement, namely that a Nash equilibrium implies
dynamic stability is generally not true. Consider, for example, a Nash equi-
librium involving strategies that are weakly dominated. It is clear, that for an
open environment of distributions with full support around the Nash equilib-
rium distribution there are ideologies that induce the choice of strategies that
gain strictly higher (real) payoffs than the Nash equilibrium strategies.
We state our main theorem for a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept
firstly defined by Balkenborg (1994). Unfortunately, its name consists also of
the words “equilibrium set”, but is distinct from the concept equilibrium set
defined in this paper.
Definition Strict Equilibrium Set (SEset) (Balkenborg (1994))
A set ∆ ⊂ ∆(Si)×∆(Sj) is a Strict Equilibrium Set (SEset), if
each σ ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium and if
for (σi, σj) ∈ ∆, σ˜i is an alternative best reply to σj, then (σ˜i, σj) ∈ ∆.
As Lemma 3 states, all elements of a SEset can be represented by restpoints of
the dynamic that exclude ideologies that are equivalent to the unbiased pay-
offs. The following theorem states that these states are also dynamically stable.
Main Theorem
Let the game 〈N,S, U〉 have a strict equilibrium set ∆. Then any σ ∈ ∆ can
be represented by a dynamically stable equilibrium set {Θs}s with respect to
a cdf F such that
i) Fi(Θsi) = σ
i(si) ∀ si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2 and
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ii) if all ideologies in Θi are equivalent to the zero bias, then Fi(Θ
i) = 0.
Proof
Fix σ ∈ ∆. For each si ∈ Si and i = 1, 2, choose the set of ideologies Θˆsi
as defined in Theorem 1. Define cdf F such that Fi(Θˆsi) = σ
i(si). Since
Θˆsi ⊂ Θsi(σj), {Θˆs}s is an equilibrium set with F (Θ) = 0 whenever θ ⇔
0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ. Since ∆ is a strict equilibrium set, for any si ∈ supp(∆i) it holds
that Ui(s
i, σj) = Ui(s˜
i, σj) ∀ s˜i ∈ supp(∆i) and Ui(si, σj) > Ui(sˇi, σj) ∀ sˇi 6∈
supp(∆i). Therefore, for all si : σi(si) > 0, i = 1, 2 monotonicity implies
gisi(F, {Θˆs}) ≥ gi(θi, F, {Θˆs}) ∀ θi ∈ Rn. As a consequence of regularity
F˙ (Θ) = 0 ∀Θ ⊂ Rn and F is Lyapunov stable. Therefore {Θˆ} is dynami-
cally stable given F . 
All results statet in this section hold for games in strategic form with finite
strategy spaces and two players and for monotonic dynamics in the sense of
Samuelson and Zhang (1992). Since we did not exploit the restriction to two
players in any stage of the proofs, we do believe that these results extend to n-
player games. In the next section, we focus on 2×2 games, give examples and
a counter example – the matching pennies game mentioned in the introduction
of this paper. The class of games including the matching pennies game does
not have a SEset.
4 Dynamically Stable Sets in 2×2 Games
A 2 × 2 game has four outcomes, for each outcome there is one bias for each
player. Hence we have to account for eight parameters. To reduce the parame-
ter space, we normalize the asymmetric 2×2-game to a game with off-diagonal
zero payoffs:
Payoffs for player i
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A B
A ai1 + θ
i
a1
ai2 + θ
i
a2
B bi2 + θ
i
b2
bi1 + θ
i
b1
→
A B
A ai + θia 0
B 0 bi + θib
The figure depicts the payoffs for player i, where ai = ai1 − bi2, bi = bi1 − ai2,
θia = θ
i
a1
− θib2 and θib = θib1 − θib2 . The payoffs for player j are constructed
accordingly. Assume without loss of generality a1 ≥ b1. We assume ai · bi 6= 0
for i = 1, 2 to have less case distinctions. A bias θi is equivalent to the
true payoffs, if θ
i
a
ai
> −1, θib
bi
> −1, and θia−θib
ai−bi > −1 for ai 6= bi. For any
σj ∈ ∆({A,B}), i’s belief over j’s actions, the set of i-biases that induce the
choice of A is
ΘiA(σ
j) = {θi ∈ R2 | σj(A)(θia + ai) ≥ σj(B)(bi + θib)} .
In equilibrium Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) = σi(si) and U i(A, σj) = ai ·σj(A) and U i(B, σj) =
bi·σj(B). Therefore gi(θi, F, {Θs}) can take only two values for any given F and
equilibrium {Θs}; gi(θi, F, {Θs}) = giA(F, {Θs}) if θi ∈ ΘiA and gi(θ˜i, F, {Θs}) =
giB(F, {Θs}) if θ˜i ∈ ΘiB.
This implies then since
F˙i(R2) = giA(F, {Θs}) · Fi(ΘiA) + giB(F, {Θs}) · (1− Fi(ΘiA)) = 0
that giA(F, {Θs}) = 0 if Fi(ΘiA) = 1 and that giB(F, {Θs}) = 0 if Fi(ΘiA) = 0.
Hence Fi(Θ
i
A) = 1 and Fi(Θ
i
A) = 0 are restpoints of the dynamic of population
i. An interior5 steady state (0 < Fi(Θ
i
A) < 1) has the following character-
istics: giA(F, {Θs}) = giB(F, {Θs}) = 0 which implies that U iA(F, {Θs}) =
U iB(F, {Θs}) ⇔ Fj(ΘjA) = b
i
ai+bi
, which can only be in (0, 1) if ai(ai + bi) > 0
and bi(ai + bi) > 0.
5If Fi(ΘiA) ∈ (0, 1), one can substitute giB(F, {Θs}) = −giA(F, {Θs})Fi(Θ
i
A)
Fi(ΘiB)
and the dy-
namics simplify for all Θi ⊂ Rn to F˙i(Θi) = giA(F, {Θs})
(
Fi(Θi|ΘiA)− Fi(Θi|ΘiB)
)
Fi(ΘiA).
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Restpoint classes of 2×2-games
To summarize, depending on b
i
ai+bi
∈ (0, 1) i ∈ {1, 2}, there are at most nine
restpoints:
(
Fi(Θ
i
A), Fj(Θ
j
A)
) ∈ ({0, bj
aj+bj
, 1
}
×
{
0, b
i
ai+bi
, 1
})
∩ [0, 1]2
5 Two examples
We illustrate the results for two examples. One example is a game with a
unique Nash equilibrium that is strict. In this case the Main Theorem is ap-
plicable and we construct a dynamically stable equilibrium set of ideologies
that are non-equivalent to the zero bias in the spirit of Theorem 1. The sec-
ond example is the matching pennies game, which does not have an SEset.
An example (unique strict Nash equilibrium σˆ = (A,A)):
A B
A (1,1) (0,0)
B (0,0) (-1,2)
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For population 1, actionA is not strictly dominant in terms of objective payoffs.
The set of types in population 1 that prefer strategy A given σ2 is
Θ1A(σ
2) = {θ1 ∈ R2 | σ2(A)(1 + θ1a) ≥ σ2(B)(−1 + θ1b )} .
The set of ideologies that are equivalent to the zero bias is
Θ˜1 = {θ1 ∈ R2 | 1 + θ1a > 0 > −1 + θb1} .
Suppose population 1 consists only of agents who have types in the set
Θˆ1A = {θˆ1 ∈ R2 | θˆ1a ∈ (−3,−2), θˆ1b < 0} .
Clearly, Θˆ1A ⊂ Θ1A(σ2) for all σ2 close enough to equilibrium σˆ2, but Θˆ1A∩Θ˜1 =
∅.
For population 2 the set of biases that induce the choice of A is
Θ2A(σ
1) = {θ2 ∈ R2 | (1 + θ2a)σ1(A) ≥ (2 + θ2b )σ1(B)} .
The set of biases the induce the same ranking over the set of outcomes as the
zero bias is
Θ˜2 = {θ2 ∈ R2 | 2 + θ2b > 1 + θ2a > 0} .
Suppose population 2 consist only of agents who believe that action A is dom-
inant. For example the set Θˆ2A consist of such types:
Θˆ2A = {θ2 ∈ R2 | θ2a > 0, θ2b < −3} .
19
Again, Θˆ2A ⊂ Θ2A(σ1) ∀ σ1 close enough to σˆ1 (in fact for all σ1) and Θˆ2A∩Θ˜ = ∅.
Define the equilibrium set as
ΘiA = Θˆ
i
A, Θ
i
B = Θ
i
B(σˆ
j) and Fi(Θ
i
A) = 1
For players i = 1, 2. In the following we argue that this equilibrium set is
dynamically stable.
For this game, U1(A, σ2) = σ2(A) > −(1−σ2(A)) = U1(B, σ2) ∀ σ2(A) ∈ [0, 1].
From monotonicity and regularity of g it follows that g1A(F, {Θs}) > 0 >
g1B(F, {Θs}) for all F2 and F1(Θ1A) < 1. Therefore F˙1(Θ1A) > 0 ∀ F1(ΘA) < 1
and Fˆ1(Θˆ
1
A) = 1 is (Lyapunov-) stable. For population 2, the unique best
reply to A1 is A2, hence g2A((Fˆ1, F2), {Θs}) > 0 and F˙2(Θ2A) > 0 ∀ F2(Θ2A) < 1.
Therefore Fˆ2(Θˆ
2
A) = 1 is also (Lyapunov-) stable.
Example (matching pennies game):
A B
A 1,-1 0,0
B 0,0 1,-1
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The matching pennies game does not have a SEset but only a unique Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies, (σˆ1, σˆ2) = (1
2
, 1
2
). There are nine restpoints:(
F1(Θ
1
A), F2(Θ
2
A)
) ∈ {{0, 1
2
, 1} × {0, 1
2
, 1}}. The phase diagram above indi-
cates that none of the restpoints needs to be stable. Consider the replicator
dynamic with g1A(F, {Θs}) = 2(1− F1(ΘA)) (F2(ΘA)− σˆ2) and g2A(F, {Θs}) =
2(1−F2(ΘA)) (σˆ1 − F1(ΘA)). The collection Θˆ1A = {θ1 ∈ R2 |θ1a > 0, θ1b < −1},
Θˆ1B = {θ1 ∈ R2 |θ1a < −1, θ1b > 0}, Θˆ2A = {θ2 ∈ R2 |θ2a > 1, θ2b < 0} and
Θˆ2B = {θ2 ∈ R2 |θ2a < 0, θ1b > 1} defines an equilibrium set given any F
that fulfills Fi(Θˆ
i
A ∪ ΘiB) = 1. The trajectories cycle around the equilibrium
σˆ = (1
2
, 1
2
), as the figure below illustrates. For the replicator dynamics it can
be shown that σˆ is Lyapunov stable.
Trajectories for the replicator dynamics
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6 Conclusions
We study a model in which interacting agents follow an ideology that specifies
the unverifiable payoffs of a 2-player game in strategic form with finite strat-
egy sets. When drawn from an infinite population, an agent knows his own
ideology, but has incomplete information of the ideology that his opponent
follows. Given a belief σj on j’s set of strategies, each agent optimizes given
the payoffs specified by his or her ideology. In equilibrium all agents of the
same population i have the same belief σj. We allow for a continuous variety of
ideologies within each population. Given any distribution of ideologies, we de-
fine equilibrium sets and show the existence thereof. We assume equilibrium
play in each instant of time. We assume that evolution selects against ide-
ologies that induce behavior which yields relatively low evolutionary relevant
objetcive payoffs. We characterize distributions that are stable with respect
to small changes (Lyapunov stability). The main result states that for any
two player game with a strict (Nash) equilibrium set, there exist dynamically
stable equilbrium sets that consist only of non-equivalent ideologies.
Appendix
Lemma 2
Gsi(σ
j) = Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) is continuous in σj ∀ i, j.
Proof:
Outline:
Given a convergent sequence {σn}n in ∆(Sj) and associated halfspaces
{Hn}n we show Hn ∪H ↓ H and Hn ∩H ↑ H and prove with Lemmata A1 &
A2 continuity from below and above. We define Hn such that Θsi(σ
j) is the
intersection of finitely many halfspaces and therefore is also continuous from
above and below.
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For any σ, σˆ ∈ ∆(Sj) define σn = σ n−1n + σˆ 1n , n ∈ N. For any si, s˜i ∈ Si
and σn ∈ ∆(Sj) define Hn = {θi ∈ Rn |Ui(si, σn) + θi(si, σn) ≥ Ui(s˜i, σn) +
θi(s˜i, σn)}, the set of types that weakly prefer strategy si over strategy s˜i given
belief σn.
6
Hn ∩H ↑ H:
We show θi ∈ Hn ∩H ⇒ θi ∈ Hn+1. Fix some θi ∈ Hn ∩H. Multiplying the
inequality implied by θi ∈ Hn with nn+1 , the inequality implied by θi ∈ H with
1
n+1
and summing up yields
Ui(s
i, σn
n
n+ 1
+ σ
1
n+ 1
) + θi(si, σn
n
n+ 1
+ σ
1
n+ 1
)
≥ Ui(s˜i, σn n
n+ 1
+ σ
1
n+ 1
) + θi(s˜i, σn
n
n+ 1
+ σ
1
n+ 1
)
⇔ Ui(si, σn+1) + θi(si, σn+1) ≥ Ui(s˜i, σn+1) + θi(s˜i, σn+1) ,
which implies θi ∈ Hn+1. θi ∈ H is trivially implied, we conclude Hn+1 ∩H ⊂
Hn ∩H ∀ n ∈ N. Since H ∩H = H, we have shown Hn ∩H ↑ H.
Hn ∪H ↓ H:
We start by showing θi ∈ Hn+1 ∩ H1 ⇒ θ ∈ Hn. Fix some θi ∈ Hn+1 ∩ H1.
Multiplying the inequality implied by θi ∈ Hn+1 with n2−1n2 , the inequality
implied by θi ∈ H1 with 1n2 and summing up yields
Ui(s
i, σn+1
n2 − 1
n2
+ σˆ
1
n2
) + θi(si, σn+1
n2 − 1
n2
+ σˆ
1
n2
)
≥ Ui(s˜i, σn+1n
2 − 1
n2
+ σˆ
1
n2
) + θi(s˜i, σn+1
n2 − 1
n2
+ σˆ
1
n2
)
⇔
Ui(s
i, σ
n− 1
n
+ σˆ
1
n
) + θi(si, σ
n− 1
n
+ σˆ
1
n
)
≥ Ui(s˜i, σn− 1
n
+ σˆ
1
n
) + θi(s˜i, σ
n− 1
n
+ σˆ
1
n
) ,
which implies θi ∈ Hn. We conclude θi ∈ Hn+1 \Hn ⇒ θi 6∈ H1.
We proceed by showing θi ∈ Hn+1 \Hn ⇒ θi ∈ H.
6The proofs for s˜i = si are trivially valid, however, only the cases s˜i 6= si are relevant.
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Fix some θi ∈ Hn+1 \ Hn. Multiplying the inequality implied by θi ∈ Hn+1
with n
2−1
n2
and adding the inequality implied by θi 6∈ Hn yields
Ui(s
i, σ) + θi(si, σ)− Ui(s˜i, σ)− θi(s˜i, σ)
>
2n
n+ 1
[
Ui(s˜
i, σˆ) + θi(s˜i, σˆ)− Ui(si, σˆ)− θi(si, σˆ)
]
Since θi 6∈ H1, the right hand side of the inequality is positive. Therefore
θi ∈ H.
Since Hn+1 = (Hn+1 \Hn)∪ (Hn+1∩Hn) we conclude Hn+1 ⊂ H∪Hn ∀ n ∈ N.
As H ∪H = H, we have shown Hn ∪H ↓ H.
We apply Lemmata A1 & A2 below with An = Hn ∩H and Bn = Hn ∪H
and conlude that F is continuous from above and below. From the definition
of H, Θsi(σ
j) = ∩s˜i∈SiH s˜in is a finite intersection and the desired properties of
F carry over to Θsi(σ
j). 
Lemmata A1 & A2 are taken from and proved in Bauer (1992).
Lemma A1 (continuity from below)
Consider a sequence {An}n of subsets of Rni·nj with An ↑ A ⊂ Rni·nj .
Then limn→∞ F (An) = F (A).
Proof:
Define A0 := ∅ and an := An \ An−1, n ∈ N. We have An = ∪ni=1ai and
A = ∪∞n=1an. Since an ∩ am = ∅ ∀n 6= m and σ−additivity of the measure F
we have
F (A) =
∞∑
n=1
F (an) = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
F (ai) = lim
n→∞
F (An) . 
Lemma A2 (continuity from above)
Consider a sequence {Bn}n of subsets of Rni·nj with Bn ↓ B ⊂ Rni·nj .
Then limn→∞ F (Bn) = F (B).
Proof:
Since Bn ⊂ B1 ∀ n ∈ N it holds that F (B1 \ Bn) = F (B1)− F (Bn) ∀ n ∈ N.
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Clearly, B1 \ Bn ↑ B1 \ B. From Lemma A1 we know that F (B1 \ B) =
limn→∞ F (B1 \ Bn) and therefore F (B1 \ B) = F (B1) − limn→∞ F (Bn). We
also have B ⊂ B1 and therefore F (B1 \B) = F (B1)−F (B), which establishes
F (B) = limn→∞ F (Bn). 
Remarks
Symmetric difference A	B = A \B ∪B \ A:
Note since we do not require F (Θ) > 0 ∀Θ ⊂ Rn, F (A	B) = 0 does not imply
A = B. Therefore dF (A,B) = F (A 	 B) is only a pseudo metric (satisfying
symmetry and the triangle inequality).
Upper hemi continuity:
Note further that Θ(σ) is not upper hemi continuous. To give an example,
consider the doubly symmetric 2×2 coordination game:
sj1 s
j
2
si1 (1,1) (0,0)
si2 (0,0) (1,1)
Then each θi ∈ Θsi1
(
1
3
)
satisfies
[1 + θi(si1, s
j
1)]
1
3
+ θi(si1, s
j
2)
2
3
≥ θi(si2, sj1)
1
3
+ [1 + θi(si2, s
j
2)]
2
3
Define E as the set of θi that satisfy
[1 + θi(si1, s
j
1)]
1
3
+ θi(si1, s
j
2)
2
3
> θi(si2, s
j
1)
1
3
+ [1 + θi(si2, s
j
2)]
2
3
− 1
Clearly, Θsi1
(
1
3
) ⊂ E. Consider some σˆj(sj1) arbitrarily close to 13 , for example
σˆj(sj1) =
1
3
+  for  ∈ (0, 2
3
). Any θi ∈ Θsi1(σˆj) satisfies
[1 + θi(si1, s
j
1)](
1
3
+ ) + θi(si1, s
j
2)(
2
3
− )
≥
θi(si2, s
j
1)(
1
3
+ ) + [1 + θi(si2, s
j
2)](
2
3
− ) .
The reader can verify that θi = (θi(si1, s
j
1), . . . , θ
i(si2, s
j
2)) =
(
21−3
3
, 0, 0, 1
3
)
does belong to Θsi(σˆ
j) but not to E. Therefore, Θsi(·) is not upper hemi
continuous.
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